could be done about it. During this most recent round of reform, I took a more active role in working with some colleagues on a reform agenda that might avoid the substantive and political pitfalls of earlier efforts, be responsive to the most serious problems in the regulatory regime, and be consistent with knowledge produced by the research community. I subsequently served as an expert witness for those defending the constitutionality of the BCRA. These activities put me in more of an advocacy position than is comfortable for many scholars. Whether they clouded my judgment about the linkages between knowledge and action on campaign finance is for the reader to determine.
Early Scholarly Consensus: The Limits of Regulation
Prior to the enactment of the first comprehensive scheme for the regulation of money in federal elections-the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)-a scholarly consensus on campaign-finance regulation prevailed. That consensus was built on the pioneering work of Louise Overacker, Alexander Heard, and Herbert Alexander. Overacker was the first political scientist to engage in systematic empirical research on campaign finance. Her book Money in Elections is based largely on political financing practices in the 1920s.1 Overacker challenged much of the reformist thinking of her day. She noted that electoral corruption dates back to ancient Greece and observed that, when adjusted for the size of the economy and population, the cost of campaigns had remained fairly constant over the ages-a point rediscovered by political scientists in recent years.2 She demonstrated how flawed design and inadequate enforcement mechanisms rendered the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 ineffective in banning corporate contributions, limiting expenditures, and providing disclosure. She described the dominance of political parties in campaign finance and their increasing reliance on very large donors.
Overacker articulated a normative position on money in elections that would dominate the political-science profession for decades to come. She argued that restrictions on political finance designed to achieve equality among candidates and among voters were ill-conceived. The goal should be not to "start all candidates from scratch" but rather to ensure that "each candidate at least [has] a chance to bring his case before the voters."3 In contemporary jargon, that means floors but no ceilings for spending. In fact, she asserted, more money is needed to provide citizens with adequate knowledge to inform their votes. Public subsidies can serve that purpose. Trying to equalize spending among candidates through limits, however, does nothing to guarantee that all candidates get their message out. In addition, she argued, contribution limits do not solve the problem of corruption, which can come with donations of any size; they are easily evaded, and there is no scientific basis for determining their size. She noted that historical precedent and comparative experience offered no examples of successful regimes of spending or contribution limits.
In addition to public subsidies, Overacker argued for public disclosure; a nonpolitical permanent enforcement agency with access to the courts; and laws designed to eliminate forced assessments on governmental workers, support from organized crime, corporate contributions, and large fees to election day "workers."
Almost three decades later, Alexander Heard provided a fresh examination of campaign contributions and expenditures in his landmark book, The Costs of Democracy, based primarily on the record of the 1950s.4 While Heard described a pattern of campaigning and political finance that departed in important respects from Overacker's rendering, his broad conclusions and normative position were remarkably similar. Money is not an evil in elections, he said, but an essential component. The cost of campaigns is neither outlandishly high nor rising significantly. More, not less, money is needed in campaigns. Campaign spending does not determine the outcome of elections. Voters, not contributions, drive policy decisions. In Heard's view, reforms that fail to recognize the inherent financial needs of the electoral system and that smack of unrealistic ethical absolutism are doomed. He argued that "negative regulation" should be supplanted by positive measures to ease the burden of fundraising and lower the cost of campaigns. In addition to abandoning unworkable limits on contributions and expenditures, he advocated public financing (both cash assistance and subsidized communications), tax credits to encourage private donations, neutral and bipartisan solicitation of funds, public disclosure, and an enforcement agency insulated from politics. Heard had an opportunity to promote his ideas as a consultant to the Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections and as chairman of President John F. Kennedy's Commission on Campaign Costs, but these efforts did not bear fruit in the policy arena.
Herbert Alexander, who has devoted his entire academic career to the study of campaign finance, worked closely with Heard as a research fellow on The Costs of Democracy and as executive director of the Commission on Campaign Costs. After completing his dissertation at Yale, in 1958 Alexander became director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, where he compiled and published quadrennial studies of campaign finance. He was the sole source of authoritative campaign-finance data before the FEC disclosure regime mandated by the 1974 law.
Alexander fit comfortably within the intellectual legacy of Overacker and Heard. His priorities were competitive elections, informed voters, and financial transparency. In Money in Politics, he sharply contested the argument of Progressives (and their modern-day incarnations, such as the lobbying group Common Cause) that money plays an inherently corrupting role in elections. He argued that more money is needed for competitive campaigns that inform voters and provide a basis for governmental responsiveness. Spending limits reinforce the status quo and deprive candidates of their free speech rights. Contribution limits produce the same malady of underfunded campaigns and depressed competition by denying citizens their speech rights. He extended this argument beyond Overacker and other political scientists of his generation by opposing the bans on corporate and labor-union electioneering, which were enacted into law in 1907 and 1947, respectively: "There is nothing inherently immoral or corrupting about a corporate or labor dollar, no more than other private dollars."5 He supported a strong system of public disclosure and public subsidies, such as tax credits for private donations; franking privileges for all candidates; and voter registration costs borne by the government. But he was concerned that direct public financing of candidates and parties could weaken the ties between national and state parties and disrupt relations between candidates and their parties.
While Overacker, Heard, and Alexander did not agree on every point, they shared a broad view of money and elections that came to dominate thinking about campaign finance among political scientists for many decades. That view-that more money is needed in campaigns, spending limits protect incumbents and thereby weaken electoral competition, contribution limits are easily evaded, interested money does not corrupt the policy process, effective disclosure can discipline the campaign-finance marketplace, and publicly subsidized spending floors (but not ceilings) will increase competition-continues to hold sway in many academic precincts today.
The Federal Election Campaign Act and Its Aftermath
This scholarly view of money in elections had some resonance in the burst of campaign-finance regulation in the early 1970s, but the motivation for and direction of reform had roots elsewhere. There were two major factors: a substantial increase during the 1960s in the costs of campaigning, especially those associated with media advertising, and the emergence of wealthy, self-financed candidates. Since both developments threatened incumbents, members of Congress began to consider new regulatory initiatives. The Revenue Act of 1971 created a presidential public-financing system funded with an income tax checkoff, but its effective date was delayed until the 1976 election. In 1971 Congress also passed FECA, which strengthened requirements for reporting of financial transactions and repealed existing limits on contributions and expenditures (except for the ban on corporate and labor-union contributions). But it also put in place new limits on the amount candidates could contribute to their own campaigns and on expenditures for media advertising in presidential, Senate, and House elections. Political scientists could take satisfaction in the initial steps toward public subsidies, vastly improved disclosure, and repeal of ineffectual limits on contributions and spending even while looking skeptically on the wisdom and constitutionality of the new limitations.
Scandals associated with Watergate and the committee to reelect President Richard Nixon prompted Congress to return to the campaign-finance drawing board. In 1974 they produced major amendments to FECA, which constituted the most serious and ambitious effort in history to regulate the flow of money in federal elections. One is hard-pressed to detect any politicalscience fingerprints on the new law. Perhaps the most influential outside player in crafting the 1974 amendments was Common Cause, whose rhetoric and reform proposals contrasted starkly with the dominant view of our profession. Congress adopted public financing of presidential elections-matching funds in the nomination phase, full grants in the general elections-but conditioned the public subsidy on acceptance of spending limits.
Ceilings, not floors, prevailed. Public financing of congressional elections was defeated in the House. Congress also scrapped the 1971 limits on media advertising but replaced them with an elaborate set of limits on contributions and expenditures. Caps were placed on what individuals, political action committees (PACs), and political parties could contribute to candidates; on the total amount individuals could contribute; and on the amount parties could spend on behalf of their candidates. Limits were also set on spending by congressional campaigns, on the amount of selffinancing by federal candidates, and on what other individuals and groups could spend independently to urge the election or defeat of a candidate. Both sets of restrictions-on contributions and spending-flew in the face of received wisdom within the political-science community. Finally, Congress created a separate agency, the FEC, to administer the disclosure system and to enforce the law. But it designed the new agency to be the very antithesis of the nonpolitical, independent entity espoused by Overacker and Heard. Congress established de facto control over the appointment of the six commissioners, divided equally between the two major parties; required four affirmative votes for any action to be taken; prohibited the agency from investigating anonymous complaints or conducting random audits; imposed elaborate procedural requirements; withheld authority to exact penalties; and denied the commission multiyear budgeting authority enjoyed by other independent agencies.6 The FEC was better equipped to discharge its responsibility for the collection and disclosure of data on campaign contributions and expenditures, a development that stimulated much subsequent research by political scientists.
Barely a year after the 1974 amendments to FECA were signed into law, the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo upheld the constitutionality of the contribution limits, the disclosure requirements, and the presidential public-financing system. But it struck down the caps on expenditures (by a candidate's campaign, by a candidate with personal funds, or by others spending independently), except for voluntary limits tied to public financing in presidential elections, and narrowed the class of political communications by independent groups subject to regulation (i.e., disclosure and limits on the source and size of contributions). The Court also ruled that congressional appointment of some members of the FEC was a violation of the separation of powers, a problem quickly remedied in Congress by giving the president the formal authority to appoint all six members. What remained on the statute books was a regulatory residue designed by no one.
FECA after Buckley marked the beginning of the end of a scholarly consensus on the role of money in elections and on the wisdom of various approaches to its regulation. Differences emerged as many new scholars were drawn to the subject matter-by controversy surrounding the Buckley decision, rapid changes in forms of campaigning and political organization, and the availability of systematic data on campaign contributions and Starting in the 1996 cycle, much of that money was used to finance candidate-specific issue advocacy in presidential and congressional elections. This campaign weapon of choice for parties had its genesis in Buckley. In that decision, the Court established an express advocacy test as a way of narrowing the scope of disclosure requirements and contribution limits for independent expenditures in light of a concern that the language crafted by Congress in the 1974 amendments to FECA was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.15 The standard was defined by the Court as communications that "in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." In a footnote, the Court offered examples of express advocacy (including such words as vote for, vote against, support, or oppose), and this became known as the "magic words" test.
The Court acknowledged that this standard would leave outside the regulatory arena much communication that was electionrelated. But it concluded that it was better to err on the side of noncoverage and avoid the risk of a vague standard chilling political speech. This express-advocacy standard was constructed to determine which communications by individuals and groups independent of any candidate or party would be subject to regulation. The Court did not require express advocacy in candidate and political-party ads for their financing to be subject to federal campaign-finance laws. Buckley stated that spending by candidates and political committees (including parties) is "by definition, campaign-related."' This express-advocacy standard had little noticeable effect on the conduct and financing of federal campaigns for almost 20 years after it was set by the Court. To open the floodgates, it took the creativity and bravado of Morris and Clinton, and the failure of the FEC to challenge their use of party soft money toward political ads. Starting in the fall of 1995 and continuing through the middle of 1996, Democratic Party committees spent an estimated $34 million on television ads designed to promote Clinton's reelection.17 None of these costs were charged as coordinated expenditures on behalf of Clinton's campaign. Instead, the Democratic Party argued that party communications not using explicit words advocating the election or defeat of a federal candidate could be treated like generic party advertising and financed with a mix of soft and hard money. The Republican National Committee responded with its own $20 million "issue advocacy" advertising campaign on behalf of its presidential nominee, Bob Dole. Very quickly the parties began to use the same funding strategy to campaign on behalf of their congressional candidates. The congressional party campaign committees shifted their focus from hard to soft money raising.
Outside groups soon followed in their wake. For groups, the advantage of electioneering through "issue advocacy" rather than through FECA "independent expenditures" was that the former could be conducted without disclosure and could be financed with soft (i.e., unregulated) rather than hard money. This meant that groups, like parties, could now solicit contributions from corporations and unions as well as from wealthy donors to finance candidate-specific electioneering communications. Political consultants routinized campaign communications as issue advocacy. In spite of the plain meaning of federal election law, after 1996 parties and groups could campaign for and against specific candidates for federal office with unlimited amounts of unregulated resources. Yet others argued that a focus on total spending may well miss the essential dynamic at work. Sorauf suggested that an international arms race may be a more apt metaphor. Rather than a gradual but relentless testing and probing of the system's constraints, an arms-race dynamic can easily lead "to a destabilization of the system, the result of which is a lack of confidence in all limits, a declining sense of how much is enough, an escalating insecurity, and a consequent scrambling for more weapons. The broader question raised in this research is whether potential challengers are systematically discouraged from running for federal office by the daunting expense of a serious campaign and a belief that incumbents can raise much more money if they need to do so. Studies of candidate recruitment suggest a diverse set of incentives and disincentives at work, including a more multifaceted assessment of an incumbent's potential vulnerability. Nonetheless, potential challengers have ready access to campaignfinance data in previous election cycles. They More scholarly controversy attends the growing importance of party soft money. Do parties dilute the influence of large donors or facilitate their access to policy makers? Do parties operate independent of incumbent officeholders, or are they largely instruments of those incumbents? Does soft money support party-building and grass-roots activities, or is it used primarily to finance communications about specific federal candidates? Have state parties thrived in the era of national party soft money, or are they more agents of national parties and politicians? Does soft money increase the electoral prospects of challengers, or is its impact neutralized because the two parties concentrate their resources in the same targeted contests? Will a soft-money ban significantly reduce party resources, or will the parties compensate by raising more hard money?
These questions have a direct bearing on the reform debate, but initial answers produced by new research are far from consensual. Scholars have had to labor with less-than-ideal data on the precise uses rather than sources of party soft-money contributions. National and state parties are required to report soft money disbursements they make in relation to a federal election. However, there are no uniform codes for the purposes of the disbursements, and information is often incomplete. It is virtually impossible to discern from the FEC reports which races involve soft money. Transfers and swaps among national, state, and local party committees make the research task all the more daunting.
Working with reports filed with the FEC between 1992 and 1998 by the 100 state parties as well as the national parties, Raymond La Raja concludes that soft money has done much more than finance electioneering issue ads for federal candidates: it has also strengthened state party organizations and supported traditional grass-roots activities.37 Scholars at the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, working from the same reports filed for the 2000 election, produce similar estimates for spending on media ads but conclude that little is spent on voter mobilization and generic party activities.38 Magleby finds evidence of substantial soft-money-financed ground wars in contested races, but these campaign activities are overwhelmingly focused on candidates, not parties.39 Expert reports filed in the BCRA litigation by Green and by Krasno Overwhelming evidence indicates that candidate-specific issue advocacy near an election has an explicit electioneering purpose. Richard Hasen45 used this evidence to reject the constitutional argument that the new campaign-finance law's bright-line test for distinguishing issue from express advocacy suffers from overbreadth.46 Critics of the new standard must perforce base their argument (that it would limit free speech) on something other than the evidence of how it would have worked in recent elections.
Enforcement
Scholars have long observed that the best intentions of Washington policy makers can be dashed in the implementation process. In a study of state campaign-finance practice, Michael Malbin and Thomas Gais observed numerous administrative hurdles to effective implementation.47 Criticism of the enforcement of federal campaign-finance law is widespread among practitioners and academics, but political scientists have done relatively little work on the FEC. Most activists and students of campaign finance accept the argument that Congress was marvelously successful in structuring the FEC to be a captive agency.48 At the same time, they acknowledge the broad success of the commission in implementing the public-disclosure requirements of federal election law (except for the growing share of campaign activities designated as issue advocacy and not subject to disclosure).
The dispute is over whether any regime of regulatory enforcement of campaign-finance violations is workable and desirable. Based on a careful empirical study of how the FEC has handled its enforcement caseload, Todd Lochner and Bruce Cain conclude that the answer is clearly no. The costs of a more effective enforcement system, they argue, would be an increase in legal contestation and political controversy and an abridgement of First Amendment rights. Lochner and Cain do not shy away from the broader implications of their research. They unabashedly embrace the abolition of contribution and expenditure limits and a sole reliance on public disclosure.49
There Following the 1996 elections, Norman Ornstein convened a small group of political scientists (Anthony Corrado, Michael Malbin, and me, plus former journalist Paul Taylor) to assess the wreckage to the regulatory regime and to hammer out a reform agenda that dealt with the most critical problems and had some political viability. We produced a report entitled "Reforming Campaign Finance" that endorsed a ban on party soft money tied to an increase in hard-money limits, regulation of candidatespecific issue advocacy near an election, strengthened enforcement, free broadcast time, and tax credits for small donors. In conclusion, these efforts by political scientists to draw on scholarly knowledge to shape the public debate on campaign finance and specific reform initiatives should not be taken as a sign of professional consensus. Indeed, on the basis of our scholarly research, I believe we can agree on a number of important matters. First, the most recent regime for regulating campaign finance collapsed in the aftermath of the 1996 election. It encouraged political actors to speak and act in a way that fostered a widespread disrespect for the rule of law and corroded the legitimacy of our democracy. The status quo ante pre-BCRA is simply unacceptable. How best to change that system is properly a matter of dispute. Some counsel repairing the regulatory system, others removing the limits that precipitated the regulatory end runs.
Second, the new law is a relatively modest, incremental undertaking, not a revolution in campaign-finance regulation. Its major provisions would leave the system to operate largely as it did early in the 1980s. It is designed to repair the most egregious tears in www.apsanet.org 79 the regulatory fabric, not to chart a new course or to remove freedoms long enjoyed by citizens and organizations. It is best viewed as a prerequisite for other changes (including free air time and public subsidies) to increase competition and ease the burdens of fundraising, not as a comprehensive reform package. Some political scientists believe that it is unwise, unworkable, and even unconstitutional. But they cannot reasonably conclude that it is revolutionary.
Third, the alternatives to the BCRA approach have their own problems. Those advocating full public financing of elections (and the abolition of virtually all private financing)64 must perforce grapple with the same issues of soft money and issue advocacy that have undermined the full public financing of presidential elections. Those who advocate removing limits on contributions and expenditures and relying exclusively on disclosure face their own daunting obstacles. This requires the repeal of laws on the books for up to a century, or else a reversal of Buckley and its progeny at the very time the public and policy makers are demanding new regulations on corporate accountability. A return to a state of nature in campaign finance, in which major economic interests can give unlimited sums to competing candidates and parties, is not self-evidently susceptible to policing by voters in a political marketplace. And given the emergence of electioneering as issue advocacy, it would either produce only partial disclosure or require some version of the new law's provisions governing disclosure now vigorously opposed by champions of deregulation.
Finally, political scientists of all stripes recognize that regulating the flow of money in elections is hard work that often leaves reformers with unfulfilled objectives and undesired consequences. Ensuring that adequate resources are available for a free flow of information among citizens, groups, candidates, and parties is essential to healthy elections, yet the manner in which that money is raised and spent can undermine democratic politics. Tensions between economic inequality and political equality are inevitable. First Amendment guarantees properly limit the reach of regulators. Efforts to limit corruption and to achieve greater equality can inadvertently reduce electoral competition. Political money is fungible, and legal constraints on its flow will divert some through other, possibly less accountable, passageways. Politicians and interest groups will exploit the weaknesses of the regulatory fabric to advance their interests.
Political science advocates of the BCRA recognize fully the imperfections of the new law and the ways in which political actors will adapt to its restrictions. For us, the question is how best to respond to troublesome developments in campaign finance without making matters worse. The problems associated with political financing can never be solved, only managed as well as possible in light of these constraints and other, sometimes competing, goals for the political system. Political scientists can contribute to this ongoing process of reform, maintenance, and repair-at all levels of government in the United States and in sister democracies around the world grappling with many of the same problems-through rigorous thinking, relevant research, and judicious engagement in the public and policy arena. We have begun to do so.
